Abstract. Automated tools for finding attacks on flawed security protocols often fail to deal adequately with group protocols. The reason is that the abstractions made to improve performance on fixed two-or three-party protocols either preclude the modeling of group protocols altogether or permit modeling only in a fixed scenario, which can prevent attacks from being discovered. This paper describes CORAL, a tool for finding counterexamples to incorrect inductive conjectures, which we have used to model protocols for both group key agreement and group key management, without any restrictions on the scenario. We show how we used CORAL to discover six previously unknown attacks on three group protocols.
Introduction
In terms of analyzing the standard corpus of two-and three-party protocols given in (Clark and Jacob, 1997) , the field of cryptographic security protocol analysis can be said to be saturated. Much research attention has now turned to trying to widen the scope of the techniques, for example, to group protocols (Meadows, 2000; Taghdiri and Jackson, 2003; Steel et al., 2004) . These are protocols designed to prescribe a way in which an unbounded number of principals may establish, and maintain, a secure key for communicating between themselves over an insecure network. The key may have to be updated as the composition of the group changes, and a trusted server may be used to facilitate the process.
This very open scenario causes problems for most automated protocol analysis tools. The reason is that they rely on concrete abstractions to fixed-party protocols, such as restricting the number of agents in the network to two or three and/or predetermining the exact scenario that is examined in terms of which agent will play the initiator and which agent the responder. These abstractions are quite suitable for fixed-party protocols but are too restrictive to allow realistic analysis of group protocols. Moreover, in most tools, these restrictions cannot easily be relaxed, as we explain in`7. In this paper, we describe the CORAL system, an approach to flaw detection based on finding counterexamples to security properties expressed as inductive conjectures. The use of an inductive model, a first-order version of Paulson's (Paulson, 1998) , allows us to naturally model a group protocol without constraining the scenario. Using CORAL we have discovered six previously unknown attacks on three group protocols: three on the AsokanYGinzboorg protocol (Asokan and Ginzboorg, 2000) , two on Taghdiri and Jackson's improved version of the Tanaka-Sato protocol (Taghdiri and Jackson, 2003) , and one on the Iolus protocol (Mittra, 1997) . We will describe these case studies in`4,`5, and`6. Our case studies demonstrate that although our system typically takes longer to find attacks on simple protocols than do competing systems, the greater expressivity of our first-order inductive model allows us to adapt quickly to different kinds of group protocols with their particular features, such as lists of keys in messages, keys consisting of compound terms, unbounded roles, and messages that change depending on the current composition of the group.
In`2, we review previous work on group protocol analysis. In`3 we describe the theory and implementation of CORAL. After that we give the three case studies:`4 concerns the AsokanYGinzboorg protocol,`5 the Tanaka-Sato/ Taghdiri-Jackson protocol, and`6 the Iolus protocol. We evaluate CORAL in`7, comparing it to related work. In`8, we draw conclusions and discuss further work, such as developing CORAL's ability to verify correct protocols, as well as attack faulty ones.
Background
A recent survey of the field of cryptographic protocol analysis can be found in (Meadows, 2003) . In this section, we briefly survey previous work specific to group protocol analysis.
Perhaps the first formal analysis of a group protocol was by Paulson. He investigated a recursive authentication protocol proposed by Bull and Otway (Bull and Otway, 1997) , as part of his development of the inductive method (Paulson, 1998) . Paulson was able to model it in the general case, that is, for any number of participants, and prove some security properties for arbitrary-sized groups. Paulson's model uses a typed higher-order logic formalism and poses security properties as conjectures about properties of the trace. These properties are then proved by induction on traces in the interactive theorem prover Isabelle/ HOL. If there is a flaw in the protocol, however, Paulson's method provides no automated support for finding the attack. It is precisely this task that our tool, CORAL, was designed for.
The CLIQUES protocol suite contains a number of protocols for establishment of groups, and groups within groups, each with their own secure key (Ateniese et al., 2000) . Extensive use is made of Diffie-Hellman style exponentiation (Diffie and Helman, 1976) . Several significant attacks on the CLIQUES protocol suite were found by Pereira and Quisquater as a result of a programme of manual analysis (Pereira and Quisquater, 2003) . Pereira and Quisquater proposed a method for converting the problem of the intruder obtaining a particular term to the solution of a system of linear equations. Using this method, they were able to find weaknesses in every protocol they examined. Often, the attacks required quite imaginative behavior by the intruder, for example, being accepted as a member of a group of size 4, and then using the values learned in that key establishment session to force a group of size 3, intended to exclude him, to accept a key he knew. One clear lesson from Pereira and Quisquater's work is that the design of these kinds of protocols is extremely tricky. It is easy to understand how the designers of the CLIQUES protocols failed to see such attacks. This strengthens the case for the use of formal methods in their design.
Meadows and Syverson used the NRL protocol analyzer (NPA) to tackle the Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) protocol suite, as part of an effort to introduce formal methods to the design stage of protocol development, (Meadows and Syverson, 2001) . GDOI is a method for group key management involving a trusted key server. NPA could not handle the infinite data structures required for a general model of a group protocol, so a concrete abstraction was made, by restricting phase two to the distribution of one Fsecurity association key_. NPA was able to find a type flaw in the protocol, which was fixed in later versions of GDOI. However, Meadows attempt to use NPA to rediscover the Pereira-Quisquater attacks on the CLIQUES suite was less successful (Meadows, 2000) . NPA was extended to handle the Diffie-Hellman exponentiation operation but could not find the attacks described in (Pereira and Quisquater, 2003) .
The designers of the protocol specification language CAPSL (Denker and Millen, 2000) have recently turned their attention to group protocols in the development of an extended language, MuCAPSL, (Millen and Denker, 2003) . After translating the GDH.2 protocol (Steiner et al., 1996) to their intermediate language MuCIL, they were able to discover a type flaw. However, their analysis requires the number of group members to be set in advance, which can prejudice the chances of discovering an attack. Taghdiri and Jackson (2003) reported results from the modeling of a multicast key management scheme proposed by Tanaka and Sato (2001) . This protocol was designed for a scenario where the group is highly dynamic, that is, agents join and leave the group frequently. The idea was to minimize the number of key updates required by supplying keys to agents on demand. Taghdiri and Jackson formalized a model for the protocol in the Alloy specification language (Jackson, 2002) and used Alloy's SAT checker to search for counterexamples to desirable properties of the protocol. Several counterexamples were found, the most serious one indicating that current members of the group will accept as valid messages broadcast by ex-members of the group. Taghdiri and Jackson proposed an improved protocol. However, their formal protocol model differed from the norm established over the past 25 years in that no active attacker was included. In Sections 5 and 6 of this paper, we explain how we used CORAL to analyze both Taghdiri and Jackson's improved protocol and the Iolus key management protocol (treated in Taghdiri's MSc thesis, (Taghdiri, 2002) and considered to be secure). We discovered that neither of these protocols is secure in the presence of an active attacker, even if he is weaker than the Dolev-Yao intruder generally used in automated protocol analysis (Dolev and Yao, 1983) .
Coral
CORAL is the first full implementation of the Comon-Nieuwenhuis method for proof by consistency (Comon and Nieuwenhuis, 2000) . It is based on an adapted version of the theorem prover SPASS (Weidenbach, 2001 ). We give a summary of the technique and how it is implemented here. More details are available in (Steel, 2004) .
THEORY
Proof by consistency (Musser, 1980) was originally designed to prove inductive theorems correct, but later versions of the technique have the property of being refutation complete, that is, able to refute any incorrect conjecture in finite time. The Comon-Nieuwenhuis method works like this: Given a set of Horn clauses E j and a conjecture C, the Comon-Nieuwenhuis approach is to produce a firstorder axiomatization, A, of the minimal Herbrand model such that C [ A [ E is consistent if and only if C is an inductive consequence of E. We call A the IAxiomatization. This is typically a set of clauses sufficient for deciding inequality of ground terms. To determine the consistency, or otherwise, of C with A [ E, we use a two-part process. In the first part, we pursue a fair induction derivation. This is a restricted kind of saturation (Bachmair and Ganzinger, 1990 ), where we need consider only overlaps between axioms and conjectures and produce inferences from an adapted superposition rule called conjecture superposition. In the second part, each clause in the induction derivation is checked separately for consistency against the I-Axiomatization. If any consistency check fails, then the conjecture is incorrect. If all the consistency checks succeed and the induction derivation procedure terminates, the theorem is proved. The separation of the main inductive derivation from the multiple independent consistency checks gives rise to natural opportunities for parallelizing the process.
In the case where a refutation is found, we are able to extract a counterexample by means of a well-known method first proposed by Green (Green, 1969) . When CORAL refutes a security conjecture of the form O trace. P (trace), it has proved in its superposition calculus that M trace. KP (trace). We track the instantiations made to the trace variable using an answer literal, following Green's method. Green has shown that this will always yield a correct constructive answer for these types of proofs.
Previous versions of the proof by consistency technique were restricted to saturated specifications. An important result of Comon and Nieuwenhuis' work was to relax this restriction. Rather than a saturated specification, they require a reductive definition, and a constructor-based specification. The definition is reductive if all ground terms headed by defined symbols can be reduced, with respect to our term ordering, by conjecture superposition. CORAL's model for the security protocol problem is a reductive definition, and details of the proof of its refutation completeness can be found in (Steel, 2004,`6.8) .
FIRST-ORDER INDUCTIVE MODEL
The aim of CORAL's model was a first-order version of Paulson's inductive model for protocol analysis. Though Paulson's formalism is encoded in higher-order logic, no fundamentally higher-order concepts (except induction) are usedVin particular, there is no unification of functional objects. Objects have types, and sets and lists are used. All this we model in first-order logic, using a sorted firstorder signature instead of higher-order types. Like Paulson's, our model allows an indeterminate and unbounded number of agents to participate, playing any role, and using an arbitrary number of fresh nonces and keys.
A protocol is modeled as the set of all possible traces, that is, all possible sequences of messages sent by any number of honest users under the specification of the protocol and, additionally, faked messages sent by the intruder. A trace of messages is modeled as a list. For a specific protocol, we generally require one axiom per protocol message, each one having the interpretation FIf T is a trace containing message n addressed to agent A, then T may be extended by A responding with message n + 1._ These axioms define a unary function m, where m(T) = true if T is a valid trace of messages for the protocol specified.
The intruder has the usual capabilities specified by the Dolev-Yao model (Dolev and Yao, 1983) . These include the ability to intercept all messages in the trace and to break down and reassemble the messages the intruder has seen. He can decrypt ciphertext packets only if he has the correct key and is assumed to be accepted as an honest player by the other agents. We specify intruder knowledge in terms of sets. Given a trace of messages exchanged, T, we define analz (T) to be the least set including T closed under projection and decryption by known keys. This is accomplished by an inductive definition using exactly the same rules as the Paulson model (Paulson, 1998, p. 12) . We define the messages the intruder may send, given a trace T, as being members of the set synth (analz (T)), where synth (X) is the least set containing X, including agent names and closed under pairing and encryption by known keys. Again, the concept of a Bleast setÂ is defined, not by some higher-order quantification over sets, but by an inductive definition, using the same rules as Paulson. We also follow Paulson's method for modeling the freshness of nonces and session keys. If T is a list of messages, then parts (T) is the least set containing the messages in T closed under projection and decryption by all keys. A nonce N is considered fresh with respect to T if N = 2 parts (T).
IMPLEMENTATION
CORAL is implemented on top of the SPASS prover (Weidenbach, 2001) . We added the conjecture superposition inference rules and answer literals. Since the fair induction derivation procedure may not terminate, we must carry out the consistency checks in parallel to retain refutation completeness. Since the consistency checks are independent from each other, we can also make them concurrently. CORAL uses a parallel architecture to achieve this, using a socket interface to send clauses for I-Axiomatization checking to separate SPASS processes running in parallel. For specific I-Axiomatizations, we can often filter out a lot of these clauses to avoid having to check them. For example, if we are using a free constructor specification, the I-Axiomatization will just specify the inequality of nonidentical constructor terms. If a clause to be checked contains defined symbols, no axioms in the I-Axiomatization will apply, so it can be ignored.
CORAL also includes a small number of domain-specific redundancy rules to prune the search space. These are:
Spy sends only protocol messages: We restrict the spy to sending only messages that match the pattern of the protocol. It has been formally proved, by Syverson et al. , that a spy who sends only messages that an honest player might accept as being part of the protocol is just as powerful as the full BDolev-Yaoî ntruder (Syverson et al., 2000) .
Spy expects only protocol messages: We can prune away any clauses representing a state where the spy is expecting to see something in the trace that cannot possibly occurVfor example, an honest agent sending his long-term keys in cleartext.
Eager pruning of unsatisfiable parts literals: As described above, we model freshness of nonces using the parts operator, following Paulson's model. We can prune out any clauses of the form in (nonce (N), parts (T)) = false, and the term nonce (N) occurs in T, using the occurs check already implemented in SPASS.
These pruning rules improve CORAL's performance greatly on all the protocol problems we have tried. Indeed, without them, CORAL would certainly not have found the attacks described in this paper. They also account for only a tiny proportion of time spent on reduction, with the standard subsumption checking and rewriting rules taking up the vast majority of the time.
RESULTS ON STANDARD PROTOCOLS
After using four fixed-party protocols for development, CORAL was tested on 10 different standard protocols from the standard corpus (Clark and Jacob, 1997) . The corpus contains examples of five different kinds of attack, so two of each kind were used. CORAL found all 10 of the attacks we searched for, five of them in under 10 seconds, j eight of them in under a minute, nine in under 15 minutes, and all ten in under half an hour. The total run time for all ten is a little under 43 minutes and 30 seconds. The longest search time was for the parallel session attack on the Andrew-RPC protocol. This took a long time to find because it is 8 steps long and requires the symmetry of the key to be exploited four times.
CORAL is slower to find these attacks than are some competing systems, for example, (Song et al., 2001; Basin et al., 2003) , which take at most a few seconds. However, it is not so slow as to be impractical. Additionally, CORAL is discovering the appropriate scenario for the attack for itself, whereas some tools, for example, (Basin et al., 2003) , require the user to decide in advance what role the spy and the honest agents will play. This quality is vital for realistic analysis of group key protocols, as we demonstrate in the case studies that follow.
The AsokanÀ ÀGinzboorg Protocol
Asokan and Ginzboorg of the Nokia Research Center have proposed an application-level protocol for use with Bluetooth devices (Asokan and Ginzboorg, 2000) . The scenario under consideration is this: a group of people are in a meeting room and want to set up a secure session among their Bluetooth-enabled laptops. They know and trust each other, but their computers have no shared prior knowledge, and there is no trusted third-party or public-key infrastructure available. The protocol proceeds by assuming a short group password is chosen and displayed, for example, on a whiteboard. The password is assumed to be susceptible to a dictionary attack, but the participants in the meeting then use the password to establish a secure secret key.
Asokan and Ginzboorg describe two protocols for establishing such a key in their paper (Asokan and Ginzboorg, 2000) . We have analyzed the first of these. Completing analysis of the second protocol using CORAL would require some further work (see`4.6). Here is a description of the first AsokanYGinzboorg protocol (which we will hereafter refer to as simply Bthe AsokanYGinzboorg j All timings in this paper are quoted for a 2 GHz Pentium IV PC with 512 MB RAM running Linux 2.4.20. protocol^). Let the group be of size n for some arbitrary n 2 N; n ! 2. We write the members of the group as M i , 1 e i e n, with M n acting as group leader.
What is happening here is the following:
1. M n broadcasts a message containing a fresh public key, E, encrypted under the password, P, written on the whiteboard. 2. Every other participant M i , for i = 1, . . . , n Y 1, sends M n a contribution to the final key, S i , and a fresh symmetric key, R i , encrypted under public key E. 3. Once M n has a response from everyone in the room, she collects together the S i in a package along with a contribution of her own (S n ) and sends out one message to each participant, containing this package S 1 , . . . , S n encrypted under the respective symmetric key R i . 4. One participant M i responds to M n with the package he just received passed through a one-way hash function h() and encrypted under the new group key K = f(S 1 , . . . , S n ), with f a commonly known function.
Asokan and Ginzboorg argue that it is sufficient for each group member to receive confirmation that one other member knows the key: everyone except M n receives this confirmation in step 3. M n gets confirmation from a random member of the group in step 4. Once this message is received, the protocol designers argue, agents M 1 , . . . , M n must all have the new key K = f (S 1 , . . . , S n ). The protocol has three goals. First, it aims to ensure that a spy eavesdropping on Bluetooth communications from outside the room cannot obtain the key. Second, it aims to be secure against disruption attacks j by an attacker who can add fake messages, but not block or delay messages. Third, it aims by means of contributory key establishment to prevent a group of dishonest players from restricting the key to a certain range. We used these goals as the basis of our investigation described in`4.2.
MODELING THE ASOKANYGINZBOORG PROTOCOL
Our methodology for modeling the AsokanYGinzboorg protocol was the same as for fixed two or three principal protocols, that is, to produce one rule for each protocol message describing how a trace may be extended by that message, j A disruption attack is an attack whereby a spy prevents the honest agents from completing a successful run of the protocol.
taking into account the tests that an honest agent will apply. So for message 2, our rule expresses the fact that an agent will send a message 2 only if he has seen a message 1 in the trace, and will use only fresh numbers S i and R i in his message. However, for the AsokanYGinzboorg protocol, message 3 posed a problem. For a group of n participants, n Y 1 message 3s will be sent out at once, each encrypted under a different key. Moreover, the group leader for the run must check that she has received n Y 1 message 2s. In order to model this without predetermining the size of the group, we needed to accommodate the possibility of different numbers of messages being added to the trace in one instant. This problem was solved by defining a new function called all _ msg2s _ received, which checks a trace to see if all message 2s have been sent for a particular group leader and number of participants. It returns a new trace containing the response prescribed by the protocol.
j It works in all modes of instantiation, allowing us to use it to construct protocol runs for various-sized groups while the refutation search is going on. We are taking advantage of two of CORAL's features here. The first is that we represent the trace as a variable that can later be instantiated to any number of messages by a single first-order rule Y we don't have the notion of one transition in the model representing one message sent such as many modelchecking approaches use. Second, we can define auxiliary functions such as all _ msg2s _ received to check more complicated control conditions. Both features were necessary to create a realistic model of the protocol. All the details of the model are available via http://homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/gsteel/asokanginzboorg-model/.
ATTACKING THE ASOKANYGINZBOORG PROTOCOL
The protocol was tested against two attackers: one inside the room, and one outside. Different outcomes are considered successful for the different spies. Note that since we are analyzing a wireless protocol, both spies are weaker than the standard Dolev-Yao spy Y they cannot block messages from arriving. This fact is taken into account in our conjectures rather than by any change in the model because, following the Paulson model, we do not channel all messages through the spy, as for example the model used in (Basin et al., 2003) does.
Spy 1 Y Outside the Room
Spy 1, outside the room, cannot see the whiteboard and so does not know the password. His objective is to effect a disruption attack. Since he cannot block messages or remove them from the airwaves, he must do this by adding messages j Note that this was required only for modeling honest agents sending message 3s, since they have to conform to the protocol. The intruder can send any combination of message 3s, no matter what message 2s have appeared in the trace. He is constrained only by what knowledge he can extract from previous messages in the trace, by the same rules as for regular protocols.
in such a way as to disrupt the protocol run, for example by making honest participants accept keys that are not mutually shared.
Spy 2 Y In the Room
Asokan and Ginzboorg aimed, by means of the contributory key generation, to protect participants against conspiracy by a group of other participants trying to restrict the agreed key to a prechosen range. Other acts of dishonesty by agents in the room must therefore also be considered. We decided to test the protocol against a spy inside the room. This spy's capabilities differ from the first in that he knows the password written on the whiteboard and is accepted as an honest agent. A disruption attack would be trivial for this spy (he could just refuse to send any messages), and he can learn the key just by taking part in the protocol, so instead his objective is to gain control of communication in the room, for example, by making all participants agree on different keys that only he knows.
ATTACKS BY A SPY OUTSIDE THE ROOM
Finding attacks in CORAL results from finding counterexamples to security properties. These are formulated in a similar way to Paulson's method. We must formulate the required properties in terms of the set of possible traces of messages. When looking for disruption attacks, we assume that the disruption comes about as a result of one agent not being able to read the message 3 intended for him. This is because the leader can see how many people are in the room, and so will at the very least send out one message 3 to each other member of the group. The following conjecture was used to check for these kinds of attacks: %% some honest XI has sent message 4, so has key f (Package): eqagent(XI, spy)=false $ member(sent (XI, XK, pair(principal(XI) , encr(pair(nonce(SI), h(Package)), f (Package)))), Trace)=true $ %% genuine messages 3 and 1 are in the trace to some agent XJ: member(sent(MN, XJ, encr(Package,nonce(RJ))), Trace)=true member(sent(MN, all, pair(principal(MN), encr(key(E), key(P)))), Trace)=true $ %% but XJ never sent a message 2 under public key E with %%nonces SJ (which is in Package) and RJ (which the message %% 3 meant for him was sent under). That means he %% dosen't have RJ, and so can't get the key from his message 3.
member(nonce(SJ), Package)=true $ member(sent(XJ, MN, pair(principal(XJ), encr(pair(nonce(RJ), nonce(SJ)), key(E)))), xtrace)=false ! Note that the final arrow (implication) with nothing on the right-hand side indicates that the whole conjecture is negative, that is, it is in the style of a Prolog query of conjoined negated goals to a database of clauses. This conjecture may look somewhat contrived, but it is a natural way of expressing that a run has been finished (i.e., a message 4 has been sent) and that there is some agent who does not now have the key. It states that for all possible traces, no trace can have the combination of genuine messages 4, 3, and 1 without a corresponding message 2. When first run with this conjecture, CORAL produced the following counterexample for a group of size 2:
At the end of the run, M 2 now accepts the key f (S 2 0 , S 2 ) as a valid group key, but it contains numbers known only to M 2 , and not to M 1 . The attack requires that the spy manages to send message 2 before the honest agent M 1 can send her reply. In a single-hop network, there is a certain amount of luck involved Y it might require M 1 to invoke the command to establish a key just after M 2 does. This is certainly possible, so we should alter the protocol to protect against it. Encrypting the agent identifier in message 1 stops the spy from sending the fake message 1 0 , preventing the attack. However, when we made this correction to the protocol and ran CORAL again with the same conjecture, CORAL found the following counterexample for a group of size 3:
This is another disruption attack, where the spy eavesdrops on the first message 2 sent, and then fakes a message 2 from another member of the group. This results in the protocol run ending with only two of the three person group sharing the key. This attack can also be prevented by a small change to the protocol, this time by encrypting the agent identifier in message 2 (see`4.5 below). CORAL took about 1.5 hours to find the first attack and about 20 hours to find the second. With these two attacks prevented, CORAL found no further disruption attacks, though this does not constitute a verification (see`8).
ATTACKS BY A SPY INSIDE THE ROOM
When considering a scenario where one of the agents inside the room is a spy, we decided to consider what might be possible when all the players in the room think they have agreed on a key but have, in fact, Bagreed^on different ones.
What if the spy knows all these keys? He could filter all the information exchanged, perhaps making subtle but important changes to a document in a predefined way, such that the other agents in the room are none the wiser. We checked for these kinds of attacks by giving CORAL the following conjecture.
% we have distinct honest agents XI and XJ eqagent(XI, spy)=false $ eqagent(XJ, spy)=false $ eqagent(XJ, XI)=false $ % they both sent message 2s in response to the same message 1 member(sent(XI, MN, pair(principal(XI), encr(pair(nonce(RI), nonce(SI)), key(E)))), Trace)=true $ member(sent(XJ, MN, pair(principal(XJ), encr(pair(nonce(RJ), nonce(SJ)), key(E)))), Trace)=true $ % and received message 3s under the correct keys, RI and RJ member(sent(MN, XI, encr(Package1, nonce(RI))), Trace)=true $ member(sent(MN, XJ, encr(Package2, nonce(RJ))), Trace)=true $ % but the packages they received were different eq(Package1, Package2)=false ! Note again that the conjecture is negative; that is, it states that there is no trace for which this combination of conditions can hold. CORAL refuted this property in about three hours, producing the counterexample trace:
: fjS 1 ; S 2 ; S spy j g R 1 3: spy ! M 2 : fjS 1 ; S 2 ; S 0 spy j g R 2 4: M 1 ! spy : M 1 fjS 1 ; hðS 1 ; S 2 ; S spy Þj g f S 1 ; S 2 ; S spy ð Þ
This attack is just a standard protocol run for three participants, except that in the first message 3, the spy switches in a number of his own (S 0 spy in the place of S 2 ). This means that M 1 accepts the key as f S spy ; S 1 ; S 0 spy À Á , whereas M 2 accepts f (S spy , S 1 , S 2 ), and both of these keys are known to the spy.
AN IMPROVED VERSION OF THE PROTOCOL
As mentioned above, we can prevent the disruption attacks by encrypting the agent identifiers in messages 1 and 2. To prevent the attack by the spy inside the room, we can require message 4 to be broadcast to all participants, so that all participants can check they have agreed on the same key. CORAL did not find any attacks on this revised version, though of course this does not mean it is verified as being correct. Here is the revised AsokanYGinzboorg protocol, with the changes highlighted:
THE SECOND ASOKANYGINZBOORG PROTOCOL
The second AsokanYGinzboorg protocol (Asokan and Ginzboorg, 2000, p. 9), requires Diffie-Hellman exponentiation to be modeled, which we have not yet attempted in CORAL. We expect that we could add equations to the model to capture the relevant properties of the exponentiation operation, but the combinatorial blow-up might be too great without development of further heuristics. However, two facts are clear from inspection of the second protocol: the first is that it is certainly susceptible to the kind of disruption attack we uncovered on the first protocol, since a spy outside the room could quite easily fake a message 1. The second is that an attack of the kind given in`4.4 is prevented by the final message being broadcast to all participants.
The TanakaY YSato/TaghdiriY YJackson Protocol
Our second and third case studies deal with group key management protocols, that is, protocols designed to maintain a secure key for a dynamic group of agents. Group key management is an area of increasing interest, driven by applications such as database access management, virtual conferencing, secure online broadcast, and so forth. Both the protocols examined here assume the use of a trusted key server. The first protocol was proposed as a result of some formal analysis by Taghdiri and Jackson (Taghdiri and Jackson, 2003) . They analyzed a protocol originally proposed by Tanaka and Sato, (Tanaka and Sato, 2001) , which was primarily concerned with minimizing the burden of key updates in terms of network traffic and processor time. Two main design features were introduced for this purpose. The first was the division of the group into subgroups, each under the management of a key distribution server (KDS). The communication between the KDSs is assumed to be not only secure but also conducted under a reliable totally ordered multicast protocol (RTOMP). Taghdiri and Jackson modeled this by assuming that as soon as one KDS updates its key, all the other KDSs instantaneously update theirs, effectively reducing the model to a single server. In our model, we also restrict attention to a single server.
The second design feature of the protocol is that agents retain a list of keys rather than just one key. They discard an old key as invalid t units of time after having received a more up-to-date key, where t is set with respect to the delay in the network. Keys are distributed only when an agent sends a request to the server. An agent will make such a request when he wants to send a multicast message, or if he receives a message encrypted under a key he doesn't know already. In both cases, he will send a message to the server giving the ID number of the newest key he has, and the server will send back all newer keys. Only the newest key is used for multicast broadcasting.
This retention of a list of keys was shown in Taghdiri and Jackson's analysis to lead to major security problems. The most serious attack involved members of the group accepting messages from a principal outside the group. A member of the group M 1 can simply broadcast a message from inside the group, leave, and then broadcast a message using the same key. Though the group key has been updated as a result of M 1 leaving, the other agents in the group will still accept the second message as valid, as they all have the old key. To counter this, Taghdiri and Jackson suggested changes to the protocol. Each agent should retain only the most recent key he has received and, upon receiving a multicast message, should contact the server to confirm that it is encrypted under the newest key. This may result in some message loss: delay in the network might mean that by the time a multicast message has been received and a key request sent to the server, the group key has changed, but this situation was reckoned to be acceptable compared to the potential security breach.
It is the improved version of the protocol we have modeled and analyzed using CORAL. In doing so we were aiming to address one major oversight of the TaghdiriYJackson analysis, namely, the lack of an active intruder in their model. An active intruder of some kind has been assumed since the very first security protocol paper (Needham and Schroeder, 1978) . His behavior was formalized by Dolev and Yao (Dolev and Yao, 1983) , and since then it has generally been accepted that the spy should also be able to pose as a legitimate agent, for example in Lowe's famous attack, (Lowe, 1996) . If anything, it would seem even more likely that a multicast protocol would be subject to attack by an active intruder compared to a unicast protocol, as argued in (Mittra, 1997) . There are inherently more opportunities for interception of traffic, and the Bcrowd^of principals would typically make it easier for an intruder to pose as another legitimate principal. Such protocols should therefore be subjected to analysis under the full Dolev-Yao attacker model, as is standard for unicast protocols.
The Tanaka-Sato protocol assumes the existence of a unicast authentication protocol that allows the server to establish an individual key (Ik) with a new member joining the group. This Ik is used to encrypt all communication between that member and the server. We model the underlying authentication protocol by assuming the existence of a long-term key shared by each valid potential member of the group with the KDS. Since we are looking for attacks on the protocol rather than trying to verify it, we can easily justify this. We can simply take the attacks we discover and examine them to see whether the specific way we implemented the authentication phase was exploited. The attacks described in this paper would be effective for any initial authentication protocol. Additionally, we make the standard assumption that the spy has access to one valid long-term key, in order to impersonate an honest agent.
Here is a description of the improved version of the protocol as described by Taghdiri and Jackson:
Joining the Group
In message 1, M i wants to join the group, so sends a join request under his longterm key K M i . The server generates a fresh individual key, Ik M i , and a new group key Gk(n). Each group key has a unique ID number n. The new individual key and group key are sent to the joining member in message 2.
Leaving the Group
In message 1, M i sends a request to leave encrypted under his individual key Ik.
The server acknowledges the leave in message 2 and generates a new group key. This key is not distributed, though; and if another membership change occurs before a request for a key is received, it will never be distributed.
Sending a Message
In message 1, agent M i signals to the server that he would like to send a message by sending what the protocol designers call a Bsequence request^message together with the ID number of the newest key he has, n. The server checks that M i is in the group and then sends back the newest key Gk(n 0 ). If no joins or leaves have occurred since M i last received a key, it may be that n = n 0 , but this will not be the case in general. In message 3, agent M i broadcasts his message to the group.
Receiving a Message
Suppose a multicast message has been broadcast, as in message 3 of the Bsending a message^fragment above. When another agent M j receives the message, he first sends a request to the server for the newest key. He then receives the newest key Gk(n 0 ), and will accept the multicast message only if it was encrypted under that key.
The revised protocol as proposed by Taghdiri and Jackson contains some redundancy as a result of their security improvements. For example, there is no reason for the server to send the key to a new member when he joins, since he is required to ask for a key update whenever he sends or receives a multicast message. Additionally, the sequence number sent in the request for a key update before sending a message also seems redundant. Previously, the server would have used it to decide which keys to send back; but in the revised version, the server sends back only the most recent key. It would be better to replace this with a nonce, as we argue in`5.2 after presenting the attacks we discovered.
MODELLING TSTJ
A feature of our model was that all the information about the state of the system, that is, the state and knowledge of all the principals involved, was stored in the trace and inferred from the trace each time it was needed. First-order rules can then be used to add an arbitrary number of messages to the trace in a single instant. This was particularly useful when we were modeling the AsokanY Ginzboorg protocol, as explained in`4. For the Taghdiri-Jackson protocol, however, this was not so helpful. Some information about the state of the system does not normally appear in the trace. For example, when an agent leaves the group, the server generates a new key, but this key does not appear in the trace. Additionally, our model follows Paulson's original design in that it does not include a Bgets^event to model message reception, such as Bella later introduced to Paulson's model (Bella, 1999) . The only events in the trace are Bsent^events; and in the presence of a Dolev-Yao attacker, these messages may never be received by their intended recipients. This approach makes it hard to work out who is legitimately in the group at a particular time, information that is vital when modeling the control conditions, that is, tests that honest agents apply before sending a protocol message. Even with a Bgets^event, a lot of digging through message trace would be required to determine group composition, and we would need to do this almost every time an agent sent a message, creating an enormous search problem. So, the model was changed to include some information about the state of the principals. The unary function m() that was previously used to store just the message trace is now an arity 4 function storing the trace, a counter, the current group key stored by the server, and the composition of the group stored as a list of triples. The triples store the agent's name, the individual key that he shares with the server for this session in the group, and the most recent group multicast key he has received. We define a Boolean function ingroup on these lists of triples that determine whether or not a particular agent is in the group. A further change is our modeling of freshness. We used to use the parts operator as used by Paulson; but in our model for this protocol, we have a counter and use this to model fresh values. Effectively, we are adopting a discrete-time model where each event in the trace, that is, the sending of each messages, is assumed to take one unit of time. Whenever a fresh value is required, such as a fresh nonce, this is given the name nonce(Tick), where Tick is the current counter value. We model multicast messages as hello (Tick), thus ensuring these are also unique. Our motivation for this was that so many fresh values have to be created in a typical scenario, for individual keys, group keys, and multicast messages, that our checking of the parts literals would quickly slow the search process. Being able to make these kinds of changes to our model to suit a slightly different kind of protocol is one of the advantages of our first-order logic, trace-based approach. Changes like these would be much harder using a tool where strong assumptions about the kinds of protocol to be analyzed are hard-wired, as we explain in`7.
Having chosen to use a counter-based model and discarded the parts operator, our third pruning rule described in`3.3 was made redundant. However, an analogous pruning rule was simple to add: if the counter variable occurs in term X in a literal ingroup (X, Y, Z) = true, then the clause is redundant, since this would require an agent at some point in the past to have joined the group and obtained a group key, or individual key, that only now is available. A similar check is applied to member (X, Y) = true literals. This rule proved to be highly effective and could be generally applied to backwards search tools using a counter-based model.
As an illustration, in Figure 1 , we give the clauses required for modeling the subprotocol for the sending of multicast messages. Note that in a further change from our original model, we record the composition of the group at each point in time in the fourth argument of the sent constructor. This is important for making conjectures about security properties later on. Note also that ingroup is an arity 3 function, with the third argument returning a list of group members without the agent named in the first argument. This is used when agents leave the group or update their keys, as in the third clause in Figure 1 . As for the AsokanY Ginzboorg protocol, it again proved useful to be able to add a new function to the theory to deal with the control conditions for a group protocol. A further point to note is that we still infer some state information about principals from the trace, for example to decide whether they should be expecting a key update message in the third clause.
ATTACKING THE PROTOCOL
In (Pereira and Quisquater, 2003) , Pereira and Quisquater attempt to lay down a list of desirable security properties for fixed-network group protocols. They define implicit key authentication, through which an outsider cannot learn the group key; two flavors of perfect forward secrecy, that is, that the compromise of long-term keys does not compromise past session keys; and resistance to knownkey attacks, that is, that compromise of session keys does not lead to the loss of future session keys. However, the properties Taghdiri and Jackson found not to be satisfied by the original protocol design fall outside of this categorization. Essentially, the reason is that we are analyzing a protocol for managing a group key for an evolving group, not just establishing a key for a static one.
The property vital to a key management protocol is that throughout the evolution of the group, agents currently outside the group should not be accepted as group members by the agents inside the group. We could perhaps call this multicast group authenticity. For this protocol, this property has two flavors. The first, which Taghdiri and Jackson call Boutsider can't read,^implies that no agent outside the group should be able to read a message sent by a member of the group. The second, which they call Boutsider can't send,^implies that members of the group should not accept as valid a message sent from outside the group.
Posing security conjectures in an inductive formalism requires some thought. We must translate an abstract idea of authenticity into a property expressed in terms of messages in the trace. For group protocol properties, our trace includes the composition of the group at each point, which becomes important now. ForThis is an attack on the protocol that hinges on the spy sending a replayed key update message in message 13. Since the key may or may not have changed since she last saw it, agent M 1 will accept this key. The problem is that there is minimal freshness information sent in the request for a key (just the sequence number of the key an agent currently holds). Enclosing a fresh nonce inside the package sent to the server requesting a key update would blunt this attack. Having discovered this attack, we realized that there is a similar one whereby a spy can send a message from outside the group and have it accepted by an agent inside the group, thus breaking the multicast other group authenticity property Boutsider can't send.^We gave an appropriate conjecture to CORAL for confirmation, and it discovered the following counterexample:
Like the previous attack, this is also a replay attack, in this case with the spy replaying message 8 in message 13, tricking agent M 1 into thinking that message 11 came from a legitimate member of the group. These replay attacks are more serious than those typically considered for fixed-party protocols. A replay attack on a standard unicast protocol usually assumes that it would be possible for a spy to obtain a short-term key by cryptanalysis or some other means, and so it would constitute an attack on the protocol if he was able to force an agent to accept an old key. In the two attacks above, no cryptanalysis in necessary because the spy can obtain some old keys by joining the group legitimately and then leave before effecting the attack. However, even if we assume the spy does not have access to a valid long-term key, and so cannot join the group, these replay attacks are still dangerous. If the spy obtains a short-term group key by cryptanalysis, he can effect an attack without joining the group. This attack can also be prevented by adding a fresh nonce to the request for a key, this time for reading a message, and including it in the reply from the server. A complete listing of the protocol model file is available at http:// homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/gsteel/tanaka-sato/.
The Iolus Protocol
Our final case study is the Iolus protocol (Mittra, 1997) . The main difference between the Iolus protocol and the TaghdiriYJackson version of the Tanaka-Sato protocol is that Iolus eagerly distributes new keys, whereas Tanaka-Sato distributes keys only on demand. Here is the protocol:
Members join the Iolus protocol in the same way as for Tanaka-Sato, that is, by use of a pairwise authentication protocol that we model with the use of a longterm key. The server generates a fresh individual key, Ik M i, and a new group key with ID n 0 , Gk(n 0 ). In message 2, the group key is sent to the new member, and in message 3, it is sent to the old members of the group under the old group key, Gk(n).
Leaving the Group
When a member M i leaves, a new key Gk n 0 is generated and sent to each member in the form of a broadcast list. The list contains the new group key encrypted under the pairwise session key of each member still in the group (the key cannot be broadcast under the old group key because this would give it away to the leaving member).
Sending a Message
The message is simply broadcast under the current group key.
MODELING IOLUS
No changes were required to the framework of the CORAL model to formalize the Iolus protocol. Though the protocol distributes new keys eagerly rather than lazily, the operations are similar to those used in the Tanaka-Sato protocol. The most complex part of the model concerns the second message of the Bleaveŝ ubprotocol. Here we must model the generation of a list for an arbitrary group. This is a straightforward task in our first-order model. We define a recursive function rekey that generates an appropriate rekeying message for a given group and given fresh group key. This function works correctly in all modes of instantiation; that is, given a rekeying message, it will return an appropriate group and key. This is important in our backwards-search process. The use of an auxiliary
Again this is a replay attack. In message 14, the spy replays a key update originally sent in message 11, while he was still in the group. So, the spy knows the group key Gk(4) even though he is no longer a group member. Note that for this attack to work, it is necessary for two honest agents to join the group as well as the spy, whereas only one was required for the attacks in`5. Note further that CORAL has discovered this for itself Y there is no presetting of the number of agents. Preventing this attack is not as straightforward as it was for the TanakaSato/TaghdiriYJackson protocol because the key updates are unsolicited, so there is no opportunity for the agents and the server to exchange a nonce. The only way to protect against replays would seem to be to include a timestamp inside the encrypted packages sent in key updates, both when agents join and leave the group. This would require all group members to have at least loosely synchronized clocks and would further require a decision in advance about the lifetime of group keys and the expected amount of delay in the network. However, this limitation seems inescapable for such protocols. In the presence of a Dolev-Yao spy it is insufficient, for example, to include the last key in the key update message as freshness information because the spy may prevent this message from being received, and then resend it once he has left the group. A complete listing of the Iolus protocol model file is available at http:// homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/gsteel/iolus/.
Evaluation
We have seen in these case studies the re-emergence in new protocols of oversights made by the designers of the first security protocols. The situations these protocols are designed to deal with are sufficiently different from the normal two-or three-party scenario to make the old mistakes hard to spot. For example, we used to consider protocols that were played through just once and then finished, whereas the group key management protocols allow users to join, leave, and rejoin as many times as they please. The oversights in the protocol design seem to be a direct consequence of the extra complexity introduced by these temporal considerations. In the case of the AsokanYGinzboorg wireless protocol, the property of Bresistance to disruption^is a relatively new idea. The attacks we discovered show that it is more difficult to achieve than the designers expected. All this is evidence for the value of formal methods in the process of protocol design and, in particular, for the value of CORAL in the analysis of group protocols. We have seen the value of a model that does not require us to preset the number of agents involved in a group Y only two agents were required for the attacks on the Tanaka-Sato/TaghdiriYJackson protocol, but three are necessary for the Iolus protocol attack. More significant, CORAL has also to discover the scenario for the attacks on the group management protocols, that is, who will join, who will leave, when they will send a message, and so forth. This is a more difficult problem than the mere interleaving of sessions normally dealt with by protocol analyzers. Tools requiring parameterization of the scenario (e.g., Basin et al., 2003) would need some development before they could perform this search because the key updates sent by the server vary depending on the composition of the group.
There were two weaker aspects to CORAL's performance. One was the difficulty of posing conjectures. For the first case study, it took several attempts to pose the security property in such a way that counterexamples really were attacks. This is particularly annoying when it takes several hours to get the counterexample. Some of the difficulty comes from the fact that is not trivial to translate the kinds of authenticity properties required of unicast protocols to group protocol situations. As we saw in`5.2, the properties outlined by Pereira and Quisquater for group key establishment protocols are also unsuitable for a dynamic group situation. For example, the property of perfect forward secrecy, where the compromise of long-term secrets does not lead to the compromise of past sessions, does not hold for either of the protocols analyzed in this paper, since they both assume an authentication protocol using long-term secrets is used to set up the pairwise keys for communication with the server. Compromise of these would lead to the compromise of all session keys from the period when the compromised agent was in the group. Clearly, the designers of these multicast key management protocols have not aimed to provide this kind of perfect forward secrecy. Instead, we have identified multicast group authenticity as the key property; that is, throughout the evolution of the group, keys used by group members must be known only to other group members. Having analyzed the first protocol, we found it much easier to form the property required for the second. There has been some work on automating the process of formulating conjectures in the inductive model (Monroy and Carrillo, 2003) , and this can perhaps be adapted to formulate properties for group key management protocols.
The second weaker aspect of CORAL's performance was the run times. It may be possible to improve on this by inspecting the output closely and looking for more heuristics to add to those in`3.3. However, the search spaces created by CORAL's open model are always going to be large, particularly when dealing with group protocols, so we perhaps should not expect too much.
At the time of writing, CORAL is the only tool that finds attacks on group protocols automatically in a general model, with no restrictions on agents and roles. Meadows' NPA has been used to attack the GDOI protocol, but only after restricting the model to one agent and a server (Meadows and Syverson, 2001) . We have seen that Taghdiri and Jackson's model was inadequate because it did not include any kind of active intruder (Taghdiri and Jackson, 2003) . It would not be easy to make adaptations to most tools for fixed-party protocol analysis in order to make them more suitable for group protocol analysis. For example, the Athena tool has achieved impressive results on fixed party protocols (Song et al., 2001) . Athena uses an extension of the strand space model (Fábrega et al., 1999) . One of Athena's requirements is that a so-called semi-bundle should be finite. However, this would be impossible for semi-bundles representing the protocols analyzed here. A strand for the AsokanYGinzboorg protocol may contain an arbitrary number of message 3s, and strands for the group key management protocols must allow agents to join and leave an arbitrary number of times. Another leading tool, OFMC, (Basin et al., 2003 ) is constrained to a one-to-one relationship between transitions and messages sent. Additionally, it requires the user to choose finite roles for the agents to play before the analysis can start. These restrictions would prevent the modeling of group protocols in an open scenario. One could parameterize the scenario with respect to the number of agents, but in its current implementation, OFMC would also require one to parameterize exactly when each agent would join, leave, and send messages, because the key updates would have to be worked out in advance to correspond to the composition of the group at the time. Of course, it may be possible to make changes to the tools to overcome these difficulties, but it would involve some significant work. Our case studies highlight the areas that would need attention.
Conclusions
We have presented CORAL, our system for refuting incorrect inductive conjectures and shown six new attacks it has been used to discover. We were pleased with the way CORAL performed on these protocols. First, the use of an inductive model meant we didn't have to make fundamental changes to our modeling strategy to accommodate an unbounded number of agents, an open-ended protocol, lists of keys in messages, an unspecified scenario in terms of joining and leaving the group, and so forth. Second, modeling at in first-order logic level in a theorem prover meant making the adaptations required to deal with complex control conditions, for example to store and manipulate a list of current group members, was straightforward. Third, in the second and third case studies, CORAL was able to discover attacks requiring a long trace of messages to be sent, indicating it has scaled up well, despite exploring a model without any presetting of the number of agents, joins and leaves etc.
A major area of future development is improving CORAL's ability to verify correct protocols. At present, CORAL can complete verifications only when restrictions are applied to the model, such as restricting the number of agents or the length of the trace, which does not offer an advantage over model checking type approaches. Our inductive framework does offer the possibility of completing proofs in an unrestricted scenario, but work will be needed to improve the redundancy checking of newly generating clauses, possibly by using critics, (Walsh, 1996) or by developing domain-specific redundancy tactics.
In other future work, we are using CORAL to refute incorrect conjectures in other areas of formal verification. We have carried out some experiments using CORAL to suggest counterexamples to buggy functional programs written by undergraduate students. This looks like a promising area of application. Another area of interest is the discovery of attacks on the APIs of the crypto-processors used in hardware security modules, such as are used in cash machines and automated payment devices. We aim eventually to use CORAL to find attacks that require brute force guess complexity considerations to be taken into account.
